This article uses an eviction in Co. Offaly to examine the interaction between national and local republican politics during the first year of Fianna Fáil in power. These politics revolved around and revealed the internal tensions within the IRA as it attempted to develop a strategy to counter the new Government, and that Government's attempt to consolidate state power, which necessitated resisting the desire among local republicans to settle ten-year old local scores from the Irish Civil War, while simultaneously consolidating the republican base at the expense of the IRA.
bailiff they would not surrender the house. The Kinnitty Fianna Fáil Club not only supported the IRA's actions to prevent the eviction, it demanded that their two Fianna Fáil TDs return from Dublin to join the agitation and called upon the new Fianna Fáil Minister for Justice to stay the eviction 2 . Four months earlier Eamon de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party had been brought to power on the electoral strength of the local Fianna Fáil Clubs and local IRA units, which, at the local level in places such as Kinnitty, often shared a common membership 3 . On the surface, the Kinnitty eviction appeared to represent a socially radical republican base directly challenging the government it had recently elected. Internal IRA and Fianna documents, however, reveal a somewhat more complex story of the Kinnitty eviction, that is, a story of internal politics within the IRA and Fianna Fáil. This article will use the eviction in Kinnitty to examine the interaction between national and local republican politics. These politics revolved around the internal tensions within the IRA as it attempted to develop a strategy to counter the new Fianna Fáil Government, and that Government's attempt to consolidate state power, which necessitated resisting the nearly universal desire among local republicans to settle ten-year old local scores from the Irish Civil War, while simultaneously consolidating the republican base at the expense of the IRA.
Before examining the eviction in Kinnitty, however, some historical context is required. During the late 1920s and early 1930s the IRA leadership divided over the question of strategy. A group of social, or left, republicans within the IRA leadership, led by Peadar O'Donnell, argued that the IRA needed to lead the masses in social agitation which would in turn launch a social revolution and smash the Free State. O'Donnell attempted to use the issue of land annuities, which the Cosgrave Government continued to collect and pass on to Britain, as the means to rally the masses. Fianna Fáil, however, successfully transformed the anti-Annuities Campaign, and its revolutionary potential, into an electoral issue and rode the issue to power in 1932 4 . Militarists within the IRA leadership opposed using the Army for social agitation. Tom Barry often spoke for this group, arguing that social agitation was mere politics, which was beneath the IRA, and that the IRA needed to focus on rebuilding the Army's military capabilities and preparing for the day when it would be in a position to resume the Civil War.
The task of balancing these two views within the leadership rested with Moss Twomey, the IRA's leader. Twomey himself was a revolutionary socialist and By 1931 the Free State began to buckle under the pressure of a general republican resurgence and the global economic crisis. In October, the Cosgrave Government responded to this threat with a two-pronged offensive. First, it secured a pastoral from the Church hierarchy that denounced Saor Eire and by implication the IRA as communistic, and then by enacting legislation that gave it the same emergency powers as those it had enjoyed during the Civil War. The attack against the IRA forced its leadership on the run while the Free State rounded up and imprisoned rank-and-file Volunteers. Coinciding with its offensive against the IRA, the Cosgrave Government called a snap election and attempted to portray its parliamentary opposition, that is, its Civil War republican opponents de Valera and Fianna Fáil, as part of the communist conspiracy. Although many within the IRA leadership retained their deep suspicion of politics in general, and de Valera in particular, the government offensive forced a change in IRA electoral policy. In January 1932, the IRA leadership suspended a previous order that had prohibited Volunteers from either working for campaigns of from voting for candidates for the "illegal Free State Assembly". The following month, with the important electoral support of the IRA and the land annuities issue, de Valera and Fianna Fáil won the election and assumed state power.
Upon entering office, ." De Valera's position towards the IRA was that once Fianna Fáil had retained the land annuities and removed the Oath of Allegiance to the British Crown, the IRA needed to accept the principle of majority rule, hand over its arms and give allegiance to the Free State 9 . Needless to say, anything short of rerestablishing the Irish Republic was unacceptable to the IRA.
A week after Fianna Fáil assumed power, the IRA leadership produced an internal document which asked and answered two essential questions: 1) can Fianna Fáil's methods and policies achieve the Republic, to which it answered no, and 2) can the IRA launch a successful revolution against the Fianna Fáil Government, to which it also answered no, placing the IRA's dilemma in sharp focus. What then was to be done? The document reasonably concluded that the new situation required a political response and asked, but did not answer, the question: should the IRA use its military capacity in domestic issues such as supporting workers in strikes or preventing the eviction of small farmers 10 ? Answering that question, of course, was bound to once again divide the social republicans and the militarists within the IRA leadership.
In May 1932, Tom Barry informed Twomey that he could no longer accept the IRA's social program, Saor Eire, explaining: "the Army is a body with a moral right to make war and kill when necessary to achieve this country's freedom, but I cannot accept the right of any organisation to make war to make effective their social programme against the wishes of the majority of the people 11 ." Barry added that any social program made it difficult for a person of his mentality to go all out for the Army
12
. Twomey replied to Barry that the IRA needed to organize the people behind the Army and to achieve that objective, a social program was essential, adding that the IRA social program did indeed represent the views of the vast majority of the Irish people 13 . Two months later, Barry again wrote Twomey to inform him that he and de Valera had held a two-hour meeting to discuss republican unity and during that meeting de Valera had offered to create a new national defense organization which would include the IRA 14 . Barry told Twomey that he was very much impressed by the offer and the IRA leadership should consider it. He had a long history of social agitation and in 1924 wrote a memo to the IRA leadership arguing that the republican movement needed to be reconstructed on the issue of land agitation and redistribution. His memo also pointed out that in his area, the Irish Land Commission was only giving land to the supporters of the Cosgrave Government, that is members of the Cumann na nGaedheal political party 18 . McGuinness was elected as a republican TD for Leix-Offaly in 1923, only to be given the distinction in 1925 of being the only republican TD ever stripped of their seat, which resulted from his conviction for physically assaulting a member of the Garda Síochána tion of challenging the Fianna Fáil Government. In fact, most of the local republican speakers refused to even criticize the Fianna Fáil Government. According to James Garvin of the Co. Offaly Council, "he did not come here to criticize the Fianna Fáil Government. He was a 'wholehogger' for its policy but if there was a law which permitted the eviction of Craven and his family it should be changed 42 ." John Finn, another Fianna Fáil county councilor, went even further, explaining that "the law which permitted the eviction had not been made by the present government. This government has been obstructed and has not got a chance to work 43 ". Such statements, of course, conflicted with Sean McGuinness' reports to the Army Council that the eviction had shown the people of Offaly that there was no difference between Fianna Fáil and the Cosgrave government. Indeed, nearly all of the local republican speakers dissociated the eviction from the Fianna Fáil Government, instead focusing on Joseph Nugent, the man who had evicted the Cravens, denouncing him as the ex Free State Army officer who had been rewarded by Cumann na nGaedheal for his treason against the Irish Republic -a man, as it was frequently mentioned, who was from the County Clare 44 . This inference, perhaps, was that Nugent was not native to Offaly and therefore in addition to his treason, he was a "land grabber" who had no ancestral right to the land.
According to newspaper accounts, the demonstrations in Kinnitty drew large crowds from surrounding counties but failed to reinstate the Craven family. The demonstrations did, however, raise enough money to build a wooden hut for the Cravens, with a kitchen and two rooms, on property near their former home . McGuinness never answered those questions and it appears that Craven had no legal right to the house. It also appears that the attempt to prevent the eviction and the agitation that followed had far more to do with his evictor, Captain Nugent, than with Craven's claim to the house, or even Craven himself. As McGuinness put it, "Craven -an old man -was never much of an asset to the independence movement. It was not so much in his favour [we acted] as it was to get a crack at Nugent and the system he represents Twomey's strategy to counter Fianna Fáil did not rest with land agitation, because he believed de Valera, unlike the Cosgrave government, would use the resources of the state to purchase the agitators. In Twomey's words, "Fianna Fáil can buy off most of the farmers who are agitating today; they are in a position to make concessions, including moratoriums 53 ." Twomey's position on land agita-tion during this period is best illustrated by his response to contemporary events in Co. Tipperary, where local republicans reported that "as a result of the failure to divide the land and give it to Republicans […] a very strong anti-Fianna Fáil feeling has developed 54 ." This report, of course, mirrored McGuinness's reports from Kinnitty. Volunteer Ned O'Reilly argued that these aggrieved republicans would join the IRA if it established an organization to lead the agitation 55 . The IRA's Tipperary O/C, however, did not share O'Reilly's opinion 56 . Twomey was cautious believing that such agitation could be seen as anti-Fianna Fáil, and asserted: "Our [IRA] position is that while we cannot very well put ourselves at the head of the agitation for the distribution of land, we certainly should not oppose it. On the contrary we should do everything we can to have as many of our people as possible fixed up 57 ." When ex-Volunteers, who were also members of Fianna Fáil, launched such an organization and claimed to have done so to support the IRA, the IRA put an end to it, telling them that while the IRA had no objections to local agitation on the part of active Volunteers or ex-Volunteers to secure land, it would not tolerate the formation of an organization to conduct the agitation 58 . While Twomey rejected land agitation as the IRA's strategy to counter Fianna Fáil, he clearly was "in favour of Volunteers, and even ex-Volunteers, getting jobs and land in preference to the enemies of the Republic
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." This was a ten-year old objective of all republicans. He warned, however, that Fianna Fáil would give a preference to ex-Volunteers, not active Volunteers and that de Valera would use land distribution in his effort to co-opt active Volunteers into the Free State 60 . Thus, Twomey's opposition to agrarian agitation, in addition to his fears that it would divide the IRA leadership, was also rooted in his fear that Fianna Fáil would use its state power to numerically weaken the IRA with the reward of land. His response to the agitation in Tipperary, although no IRA units were involved as was the case in Kinnitty, is instructive. He once again demonstrated his aversion to directly challenging Fianna Fáil, which he believed would be seen by the republican base as weakening Fianna Fáil and by implication assisting the "Cosgrave Murder Gang." During this period, the IRA outlined its position regarding Fianna Fáil in a dispatch to the United States: "We cannot afford to be put in a 54. Letter ". Even though Fianna Fáil had secured an absolute majority in the January 1933 General Election, many TDs contended that the majority would have been even larger if it was not for the Land Commission's unjust treatment of local republicans in the distribution of land 63 . As such, "a complete revolution of the Land Commission was demanded and that special attention should be given to the IRA in the distribution of land 64 ". De Valera rejected this demand, as well as demands to establish a tribunal to try individuals for crimes against republicans during the Civil War, by arguing for "the necessity of closing finally the chapter of the Civil War in Ireland 65 ". While de Valera successfully resisted demands from his republican base to settle ten-year old scores against their Civil War enemies, he was forced to accept the principle that his Government needed to consult the party before enacting policy that would change the "economic outlook" of the Fianna Fáil movement 66 . When Fianna Fáil consolidated state power, the Land Commission became an instrument to reward loyal party supporters with land, just as Cumann na nGaedheal had used it to reward its supporters 67 . De Valera used state employment, pensions and land distribution to convert active Volunteers into ex-Volunteers, just as Twomey had warned. Republican Marie Comerford later described such largess as "Fianna Fáil bribery 68 ". Even though de Valera and his Fianna Fáil Government resisted the demands from the republican base to punish individual members of Cumann na nGaedheal, their retention of the land annuities and the ensuing Economic War and protectionism exacted a collective punishment as the price of cattle was nearly cut in half between 1932 and 1935 69 . This reduction hit large ranchers the hardest, that is to say, the supporters of Cumann na nGaedheal. When de Valera refused to punish individual opponents, such as Joseph Nugent, it was challenged by many republicans; both within the IRA and Fianna Fáil, but the overwhelming majority of republicans had no other option than Fianna Fáil. The deep social, political, cultural and economic division within Irish society produced by the Civil War created such an environment that by 1932 even the most radical republican hesitated to criticize Fianna Fáil, fearing that to do so would be tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy, that is, to Cumann na nGaedheal. This was evident in Kinnitty. During the agitation, the McGuinness brothers had warned Fianna Fáil that it would be punished by republicans for its failure to support Craven . As the republican base became increasing radicalized by the anti-British rhetoric, and as Fianna Fáil successfully framed a financial and tariff dispute as an "Economic War", Twomey saw an opportunity for the IRA to challenge Fianna Fáil's leadership in the new struggle with Britain. In the autumn of 1932, the IRA launched the Boycott British League which attempted to convince people in Ireland to stop purchasing British made goods. When this failed -apparently people in Ireland actually liked some British goods -the League attempted to enforce the boycott which quickly degenerated into a series of stunts as IRA units traveled the country smashing bottles of Bass Ale and boxes of Cadbury Chocolates. Such campaigns, of course, could not rebuild the revolutionary republican movement nor challenge Fianna Fáil for the hearts and minds of the republican base. Unlike the agrarian agitation of the Kinnitty eviction, however, the Boycott British League did assist Twomey in his main goal of maintaining Army unity as it was supported by both the social republicans and the militarists; indeed, both Sean McGuinness and Tom Barry eagerly joined the campaign.
In September 1932, George Gilmore, perhaps the deepest thinker among the social republicans within the IRA leadership, wrote to Twomey:
I do not agree with Peadar O'Donnell in his belief that there is a revolutionary situation in the country only waiting for someone to assume leadership. On the contrary, I believe that particularly all the republican and anti Free State feeling in the country is hopelessly pro-Dev., and that Fianna Fail are going to hold the i eld for a very long time to come, and I do not see how anything we could have done for the past 6 months would have altered that 73 .
Gilmore's analysis proved prophetic, although one suspects that Gilmore did not imagine that Fianna Fáil would remain Ireland's largest political party for nearly 80 years. Fianna Fáil's ascension to state power presented the IRA leadership with a problem for which it never found an answer; perhaps it never really understood the question, perhaps there was no answer as Gilmore suggested. Twomey and others within the IRA wondered if their hatred of the "Cosgrave Murder Gang" would lead to their demise at the hands of Fianna Fáil: "Some of us have a feeling that Fianna Fáil know we are so much opposed to the late Imperial gang that we would go a long way to end their power for all time. They wonder could they exploit that opposition to the point of abolishing ourselves 74 !" The evidence suggests yes. Their mutual defeat in Civil War and the resulting deep mutual hated of the Cosgrave regime and its supporters had bound all republicans together. From Fianna Fáil's formation in 1926 to its ascension to state power in 1932, most republicans saw no inconsistency in supporting both the IRA and Fianna Fáil. Once in power, of course, the former "slightly constitutional party" became fully constitutional and republicans, such as those in Kinnitty, were now forced to choose between the IRA and its revolutionary republicanism or Fianna Fáil's constitutional republicanism, which was now sweetened with the material and psychological rewards of state power, that is, a republicanism that could cut your land annuity payments in half and control the Land Commission's distribution of land. Subsequent election results suggest that for the overwhelming majority of republicans this was not a difficult choice.
